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In the Foreword to this powerful little book, Marc Bekoff notes that Gruen provides 
“a powerful new way of thinking about our ethical responsibility to protect animals” 
(vii). Bekoff sets the stage by highlighting the indispensability of empathy for grasp-
ing animal behavior: empathy is “a necessary perspective for scientific understand-
ing” (viii). For humans as well as other social animals, “[e]mpathy allows individu-
als to form and maintain social bonds and to understand and negotiate their social 
relationships” (ix). Thus we could better address moral problems if were to “deepen 
our empathetic engagement with each other,” and Entangled Empathy “guides us in 
doing just that” (ix). 
Gruen’s volume contributes to an explosion of recent work on empathy and its role 
in moral life. Some of the most important work appears in Empathy: Philosophical 
and Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie (Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2011) and Empathy and Morality, edited by Heidi L. Maibom (Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2014). (The latter includes a piece co-authored by Gruen and Kristin An-
drews.)
While Gruen acknowledges her debt to Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation and other 
extensionist approaches to animal ethics, her work in the animal liberation move-
ment brought two realizations. First, “the idea of ‘animal suffering’ was much too 
general and broad,” failing to convey “the depth of experiences particular chickens, 
chimpanzees, cows, cats, and others had” in all their specificity (1). Secondly, “[it] 
was hard to get other people to see what was wrong with causing animals to suf-
fer just by telling them that animals suffer” (1). To make a difference, people need 
to recognize “that we are already in relationships with other animals”—and, for the 
most part, not good ones (2). Inspired by Marti Kheel, Gruen began writing about 
sympathy and related ideas twenty-five years ago. This book draws on her work over 
that timespan, including revisions and original ideas (2).
Chapter 1 lays out a critique of traditional animal ethics and situates Gruen’s ap-
proach in an alternative ethics of care. Chapter 2 discusses what empathy is and 
explores misconceptions about it, including the charges of “empathy skeptics.” Chap-
ter 3 explores the possibilities and limits of entangled empathy, responding to envi-
ronmental ethicists who urge us to extend empathy beyond sentient beings. Chapter 
4 addresses empathetic errors and how we can correct them. One of the pleasures of 
the book is that Gruen weaves personal experiences of friendship and empathy with 
other animals into her narrative, illustrating that the philosophical is personal. One 
of its weaknesses is that Gruen leaves some ideas insufficiently defended. Yet at other 
times she makes exactly the right point, concisely and effectively. 
Jenni | Review:  Entangled Empathy: An Alternative Ethic For Our Relationships with Animals
 commons.pacificu.edu/eip eP1577 | 3
In light of the multiple meanings of “empathy” within and across disciplines, Gruen 
provides her definition early on. Entangled empathy is
a type of caring perception focused on attending to another’s experience of  
wellbeing. An experiential process involving a blend of emotion and cognition 
in which we recognize we are in relationships with others and are called upon 
to be responsive and responsible in these relationships by attending to another’s 
needs, interests, desires, vulnerabilities, hopes, and sensitivities (3).
This is a densely packed conception that goes far beyond what most people—specialists 
and laypersons alike—understand by empathy. Including recognition of relationships 
and responsibilities makes Gruen’s definition idiosyncratic. That need not be a problem, 
so long as we can understand and make good use of her conception, but it will dilute its 
power for audiences who find the complex experience Gruen describes unfamiliar.  Many 
understand by empathy the capacity to share an affective state with another because 
one has attended to and imagined being in the other’s position—roughly the first half of 
Gruen’s definition—and these elements are the most widely shared among differing con-
ceptions.  But the recognition of relationship and corresponding responsibilities are (for 
many) dimensions of moral thinking that go beyond empathic experience and are in fact   
separable from it. Thus Gruen’s discussion is at times misleading, suggesting that empathy 
(as more commonly understood) has more power than in fact it carries.
Gruen opens Chapter 1 with a trenchant attack on traditional practical ethics. “Ethical 
theory should help guide our actions toward making the world better” (7), she observes; 
it should “both motivate us and point us in the direction of what to do. Unfortunately, 
it rarely does either” (8). Academic ethics has become “a rarefied business, with little 
relevance” to ordinary people’s lives (8). Approaches in the vein of Singer’s famine relief 
argument “flatten or erase the complexity of actual moral problems” (11). Appeals to 
abstract reasoning and universal principles can seem “detached and mechanical” (11). 
Worse, such reasoning “stereotypes the individuals suffering as objects to be aided. They 
are nameless and interchangeable. . . . We don’t attend to the particularities of their lives. 
. . .” (11). Standard arguments, moreover, ignore larger questions of context: “social and 
political structures and ideologies,” as well as relationships and “other things that make 
life worth living” (13). Thus they limit our moral imagination, blind us to our own roles 
in problems and moral solutions, are thoroughly alienating, and leave many unmoved 
(13).  
Gruen notes that much of animal ethics exemplifies these flaws. “The standard arguments 
. . . follow traditional approaches in relying on abstract individualism, where individual 
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interests and experiences are put into categories of similarity, generalized over, and be-
come interchangeable” (25). Tom Regan’s and Peter Singer’s divergent theories both focus 
on “sameness”: the idea that “there is no morally relevant distinction between human and 
nonhuman animals that can justify” humans’ exploitation of animals (15).  They focus on 
the fact that “other animals share many of the qualities that we admire in ourselves and to 
which we attach moral significance” (17), and conclude that we ought to value those qual-
ities in whatever beings they arise. Gruen worries about “arrogant anthropocentrism,” 
which elevates the human perspective above all others; she thinks the focus on similari-
ties risks “unwittingly projecting our human preoccupations onto other animals” (24).
In these approaches, what matters is “the harm or interest setback, the suffering or 
disrespect, understood abstractly” (25). While these things do indeed matter, what 
traditionalists overlook is that 
the harm or interest setback matters . . . in the context of a particular life. 
The  abstract perspective allows us to overlook unique capacities that other 
animals possess, and risks substituting our judgments of what is beneficial for 
other animals for what actually does promote their wellbeing (25). 
In contrast, Gruen situates her work within an ethics of care, with its focus on “the 
particularity of caring relationships, informed by context. . . .” (32) and attention to 
the “economic, political, . . . and cultural underpinnings of systems of animal exploi-
tation, commodification, and cruelty” (36). Gruen references her contributions to 
this approach in volumes such as The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics, edited 
by Carol J. Adams and Josephine Donovan (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2007) 
and rehearses the differences in emphasis between traditional theories and an ethics 
of care: abstraction vs. context, individualism vs. relationality, impartiality vs. con-
nection, conflict vs. responsiveness (33-4).
Traditional ethics is indeed alienating to many—and strangely incapable of changing 
people’s conduct—and we need to understand why.  Gruen helps explain why many 
people who confront the unassailable reasoning of Singer’s famine relief argument 
and equally sound attacks on factory farming (by Rachels, DeGrazia, Engel, and oth-
ers) fail to act in light of their conclusions. She is, right, too, to say that ignoring eco-
nomic and cultural contexts is a mistake: attention to such things is clearly needed if 
we are to bring an end to massive industries that harm animals.
Yet some of Gruen’s criticisms miss the mark. While Singer’s and Regan’s approaches 
indeed ignore the complexities of particular situations, their focus on “abstractions,” 
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or general truths, is needed to get us to recognize and put a stop to the worst harms 
visited on animals: torture, suffering, and death on factory farms. To understand the 
immorality of animal industries, there’s no need to know the personality, life-story, or 
cognitive abilities of any particular cow, pig, or chicken: it is enough to note that bru-
tal abuse is taking place. From the perspective of eliminating the worst abuses first, 
traditionalists focus on precisely the most important features of the situation: current 
practices cause severe suffering to sentient beings without good reason. To focus on 
that salient fact is not to “stereotype” animals as interchangeable objects to be aided; 
it is simply to note the immediate moral emergency: billions of animals urgently 
need our help. This is certainly compatible with empathy for individual animals, and 
the particularist approach comes into play when we seek to enhance the welfare of 
individual animals who have been rescued and whom we encounter in everyday life.   
There’s no “anthropocentric arrogance,” moreover, in focusing on experiential capa-
bilities that humans share with other animals. It isn’t the fact that other animals are 
like us that give these traits moral relevance for the extensionists,   and focusing on 
them  has nothing to do with “admiring” our own experiential traits.  Sentience and 
being the subject of a life are morally relevant because they entail that what happens 
to a being matters to that being; it affects her experiential welfare. There’s nothing 
anthropocentric in focusing on this salient fact.  
In Chapter 2 Gruen clarifies her conception of empathy, distinguishing it from many 
other definitions out there, and distinguishes sympathy from empathy. This distinc-
tion, too, is understood in different ways; but Gruen’s way of marking it is plausible 
and helpful. She designates as sympathy a response to something bad happening 
to someone else in which the sympathizer retains “her attitudes, beliefs, feelings, 
etc.” and “does not try to understand or feel what the child, or the cat, or the elderly 
person feels from their point of view” (44). The sympathizer identifies the unfortu-
nate event, but it “is felt from the outside, the third-person perspective” (44). One 
can feel sympathy for another’s plight but remain “rather removed” from that plight. 
Sympathy also carries “the potential for being condescending” and mistaken, since 
in light of one’s own attitudes, one may perceive a situation as unpleasant for another 
even though the other might be enjoying or indifferent to it.  In contrast, empathy 
“recognizes connection with and understanding of the circumstances of the other” 
(45). Empathy is more intentional and purposive than sympathy: “the goal is to try to 
take in as much about another’s situation and perspective as possible” (45). Moreover, 
empathy “packs a greater motivational punch” than sympathy (45).  
Gruen observes that while many refer to compassion, sympathy, and empathy as 
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“‘moral emotions,’ they are more appropriately thought of as different forms of atten-
tion” (37). This seems exactly right.  Rather than being an emotion like fear, grief, or 
joy, empathy is parasitic and dependent on others’ feelings; it resonates or echoes or 
“simulates” others’ emotions in light of focused attention to them. Gruen character-
izes empathy as “a kind of moral perception” (39). She powerfully invokes Iris Mur-
doch’s classic criticism of moral theory’s exclusive attention to outward behavior and 
neglect of “the inner life of the agent” (27). Murdoch suggests that a more accurate 
account of moral experience would include “the process and work of attending to a 
problem” (27). A full account of moral agency must focus on attentiveness and the 
development of moral perception.  
For Gruen, empathetic moral perception requires “responsiveness to a wide array of 
information” and an exercise of judgment “to determine what information is avail-
able, what additional information might be required, and whether the information 
that one acquires is relevant” (42). This kind of judgment is different from and prior 
to ordinary judgments about what one ought to do; moral perception “helps a person 
to see what is morally relevant . . . in a particular context,” helps shape our judg-
ments, and “allow[s] us to do the right thing in light of what we perceive” (42).
Among the disparate phenomena referred to as empathy, Gruen’s focus is our ca-
pacity for “cognitive empathy,” in which we “purposely and thoughtfully take the 
perspective of another being” in “a reflective act of imagination” (48). In its most 
developed form, it involves not just “feeling with” the other, but also “a fairly complex 
set of cognitive skills and emotional attunement” (50). Thus empathy is “the ability to 
blend emotion and cognition to understand the situation of the other and try to help 
them overcome a problem. . .” (51).  
Gruen responds to empathy skeptics such as Jesse Prinz and Paul Bloom, who ques-
tion empathy’s role in moral judgment and moral motivation (53). She is especially 
strong in addressing charges that empathy is prone to “in-group biases” and “proxim-
ity effects” (54). Such claims are often based on laboratory studies in which empa-
thetic responses are measured in response to people being shown pictures of faces. 
Not all studies show the biases in question, however; and Gruen concurs with Simon 
Baron-Cohen, a leading empathy researcher who (wonderfully) “is not convinced 
any lab studies correspond to real-world behavior” (55). Moreover, Gruen points out, 
we’ve all “witnessed people showing great empathy for others who are quite different 
from ourselves, including nonhuman animals” (55).
Gruen notes that empathy skeptics “direct their criticism at a type of empathy that 
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is akin to an initial reaction, one that isn’t subject to critical reflection” (56). Em-
pathy that is biased toward those like us or close to us is “an unreflective empathy.” 
Entangled empathy, in contrast, “directs our attention to the things that need moral 
response, can help provide context and understanding [about the right response], 
and . . . can provide us with a more accurate picture of . . . what our responsibilities 
to others might be” (56). If we work to improve our empathy in this rich sense of the 
term, we can surmount the problems skeptics point to. Here, though, it matters that 
Gruen’s conception of empathy goes beyond what most people—and certainly em-
pathy skeptics—understand by the term. Empathy skeptics could respond that it isn’t 
empathy understood in the ordinary sense—i.e., putting oneself imaginatively in the 
other’s place and feeling what the other feels— that provides these insights, but rather 
attention to a problem, knowledge-gathering, and ordinary moral reflection. 
Gruen provides a better response when she shows how empathy with another “can, 
and often does, fundamentally alter one’s perception” (75). She  describes her friend-
ship with a young chimp called Emma and reports that she was “radically trans-
formed by it” (77). The encounter changed Gruen’s thinking not only about her 
relationship with Emma, but also about her relationships with other chimpanzees, 
“some of whom I know, and some of whom I don’t” (77). Gruen noticed “how the 
relationships we had with immediate others who were different could help us expand 
our perception to even more different others” (77). In her case it led to her becom-
ing an advocate for chimps all over the world. Once we are attuned to one individual 
animal, we recognize that we are in relationships with many animals we will never 
have the opportunity to meet or directly encounter, and we come to see our responsi-
bilities to those others differently. 
Gruen is right: empathizing with a single animal can alter one’s perspective in a 
radical way, bringing home awareness of what animals are like, the harms done to 
them, and one’s own part in systems of exploitation—an awareness that was absent 
or merely abstract before.  Any teacher who has brought students to a Farm Sanctu-
ary to interact with farmed animals can bear witness to the transformative power of 
embodied, empathic interactions with individual animals. Empathizing with a single 
animal, far from biasing one toward (only) animals who are present or nearby, can 
enlarge one’s moral perception to include others, and energize one to take action to 
help distant animal others.
Gruen notes pitfalls for empathy that are pertinent to animal-protection work: it can 
devolve into a “narcissistic projection” of our own interests and desires onto others 
(56). We can unwittingly project what we would feel or want in a parallel situation 
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onto another animal and be mistaken; Gruen’s example of wanting to cuddle a sick 
hen when in fact “the sick hen might be better off left alone” (57) perfectly captures 
the point. In other cases ideology—e.g., a commitment to noninterference or (I 
would add) determination to eradicate “invasive species”—can blind one to suffering 
in animals and lead one to neglect appropriate action.  To avoid these errors, we need 
to focus carefully on the specific context of the other, “their idiosyncratic desires 
and personalities” and relevant facts about their developmental and evolutionary 
histories.  To empathize adequately requires openness to gathering information and 
learning, commitment to critical reflection, and (often) consultation with experts 
intimately familiar with the “life-worlds” of specific animals: ethologists, ecologists, 
and caregivers.  
In one of the strongest discussions of the book, Chapter 3 responds to suggestions by 
some environmentalists that we extend empathy beyond sentient beings to natural 
objects such as mountains and rivers. Gruen observes that while “[b]eing aware of 
our life in a web of life matters” (69), empathy is not “the appropriate ethical re-
sponse to the non-sentient world” (68). Relationships we may have to “the meadow 
or the wetland or the insects that inhabit them” (70) are profoundly different from 
the relationships we can be in with sentient beings, and are not susceptible to empa-
thy (assuming insects are not sentient) in any but a metaphorical sense.  
 That entangled empathy stops at the boundaries of sentience “does not mean there 
aren’t other forms of care and attention that could and should be directed at the rest 
of nature” (74). In other words, entangled empathy is not the only “ethical tool” (74). 
Gruen’s clarity about empathy’s appropriate targets, and how empathy differs from 
other kinds of caring, illuminates the peculiar and damaging tone-deafness of many 
environmentalists to animal suffering. Too often, environmentalists fail to discrimi-
nate between natural objects we value (including animal species) and individual 
animals who suffer. Happily, Marc Bekoff ’s “compassionate conservation” movement 
seeks to remedy this fault.  
Chapter 4 discusses empathetic errors and how we can address them. Gruen address-
es two kinds of mistakes: epistemic inaccuracies and ethical inaccuracies.
Epistemic empathic mistakes involve over- or underestimating the nature or weight of 
others’ mental states (83). These errors are particularly worrisome in the case of other 
animals, who cannot easily correct them.  It may seem odd that Gruen would worry 
about overestimating others’ suffering. It’s true that we may exaggerate the distress of 
someone accustomed to bigoted slights or injuries (her example) and thus respond 
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inappropriately, but it’s unlikely that such responses will be harmful; they are more 
likely to be annoying and perhaps condescending. 
Still, the potential for error is there. Some of us have found ourselves hoping we were 
making such an error when we’ve empathized with an animal companion we have 
brought to the vet; we hope that some instinct or physiological reaction makes their 
distress and fear less intense than we assume it to be. (In response to a non-fatal lion 
attack on a man who reported experiencing little pain during the mauling, Albert 
Schweitzer expressed his fervent hope that shock lessens the suffering of animals being 
taken down by predators, so that they suffer less than we generally suppose.) 
More often, of course, and more importantly, we underestimate the suffering of others: 
“. . . white people in a culture of anti-black racism cannot understand the full weight 
of years that burden those who experience racism, as well as . . . feelings of invisibility, 
rejection, and disrespect. . .” (87). In the case of other animals, it may seem impossible 
to imagine “what a dairy cow or a lab rat or a captive chimpanzee” might be thinking 
and feeling; as Thomas Nagel puts it, we are “always limited by the resources of our own 
minds” (87). However, we should not be complacent about this difficulty: to some de-
gree “[i]ncomplete empathy can be corrected” (88). The empathizer can seek out more 
details of the particulars of a situation and of the nature of the animal involved; we can 
try to fill in gaps in our knowledge to get closer to adequate empathy, by learning more 
about the animal’s physiology, ethology, behavioral instincts, and so on.    
Other errors are more difficult to remedy. Gruen discusses two kinds of ethical empa-
thetic mistakes: “affected ignorance” and “empathetic overload.” In the latter, the em-
pathizer (usually an activist) fails to modulate her empathy in order to care for herself. 
Witnessing “so much cruelty, suffering, death, and human indifference” can drive a per-
son to withdraw and shut down, burn out or break down.  Like a triage doctor in the 
field, the activist may have good reasons to temper empathy in order to remain emo-
tionally healthy and continue to function. “Disengaging is an important tool for coping 
in the face of so much horror” (91).
Gruen is right, but she might have attended to the paradox and potential tragedy in 
this: in order to address the evils of animal abuse and exploitation, one may need to 
alter one’s character by quashing one’s own empathy. This should be recognized as a 
sacrifice and sorrowful necessity, for it is not clear than one can switch empathy on and 
off at will; perhaps the activist must permanently blunt her empathy to preserve her 
wellbeing and continue her work. If so, this is an unfortunate and tragic consequence of 
tempering empathy for self-protection.
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Gruen notes that “too many people choose to ignore suffering and disengage their 
empathetic responses to that suffering because it ‘feels’ like overload” (92), when in fact 
that decision is not warranted.  This excellent point is directed at people we have all 
encountered, who carefully shield themselves from distressing footage of animal abuse, 
judging (much too soon and without really trying) that they “cannot take it.” If those 
people are engaged in abusive relationships with animals (e.g., if they still eat meat 
or eggs or cheese), avoiding painful empathy is in fact shirking their responsibility to 
recognize and remedy their relationships with animals, in the interest of avoiding (their 
own) distress. 
A more disturbing and intractable error is what Michele M. Moody-Adams calls “af-
fected ignorance.” Gruen’s prime example is the attitude of animal experimenters who 
do not empathize with their subjects as they cause them terrible suffering.  The experi-
menters’ error is not epistemic: they know that (e.g.) cats feel pain and know that they 
are causing them pain. Rather, the animal experimenter is “making an ethical mistake 
in failing to empathize” (90). Gruen notes that “[s]ome social institutions require that 
[participants] make this mistake for their very existence and thus they have an interest 
in promoting and naturalizing the failure” (90). This failure, built in to the institution 
of laboratory animal research, Gruen characterizes as “willful or affected ignorance . . . 
choosing not to know what one can and should know” (91). The experimenter chooses 
to accept misinformation about animal subjects and “does not allow her empathy to be 
engaged by their suffering” (91).
But Gruen has misdiagnosed the problem in this critically important case. Experiment-
ers need not be misinformed about animal subjects to refuse to engage their empathy. 
In fact, animal experimenters would likely respond to the accusation of “affected igno-
rance” that they are in fact modulating their empathy in order to complete the impor-
tant work of biomedical research for the benefit of future humans.  They would liken 
their blunting of empathy to the triage doctor’s tempering of empathy in the interest of 
saving lives. Gruen remarks that if the experimenter is “committed to perceiving things 
accurately,” she will no longer ignore relevant information (about animal suffering) and 
will seek out information about how she is affecting the wellbeing of her animal sub-
jects. But the experimenter may reply that this would render her incapable of continu-
ing with important research that will prevent the suffering of future humans.
This is precisely where theoretical approaches such as Singer’s and Regan’s are needed. 
Animal researchers assume that human suffering is more important than the suffering 
of other animals: most are deeply speciesist. Hence the power of the argument from 
marginal cases, focusing on similarities between mentally handicapped humans (whom 
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we no longer find it acceptable to use in biomedical research) and the nonhuman ani-
mals suffering in laboratories: both feel pain and suffer, both have lives and experiences 
that matter to themselves regardless of any use they have to others. Without putting 
a chink in the armor of speciesism via “abstract” arguments that focus on similarities 
between vulnerable humans and other animals—the kind of argument Gruen attacks in 
Chapter 1—appeals to animal researchers to engage their empathy will get us nowhere. 
Tom Regan’s point about the need for “many hands on many oars” in the animal pro-
tection movement is illustrated nicely here. To bring down the practice of invasive 
animal research, we need a well-informed and empathetic public who have witnessed 
exactly what befalls laboratory animals—but we also need the fall of speciesism: the 
weighting of human suffering more heavily than other animals’ suffering on the basis 
of species alone. Focusing on similarities between past wrongful research using hu-
man subjects and current research using animal subjects can—and often does—get 
open-minded inquirers to see the wrongness of animal research. The experimenters 
themselves may be too steeped in ideology and self-interest to be capable of break-
ing through their bias; but if sufficient proportions of the public can do so, empathy in 
conjunction with moral arguments exposing speciesist bias may be enough to bring the 
institution down.
Nevertheless, Gruen makes essential and terrific points. Correcting empathetic failures 
and developing skills for better empathy are important both for those in need of care 
and for the empathizer herself. “Entangled empathy helps us to deepen the disposition 
to attend in appropriate and meaningful ways to the effects of our actions within com-
plex networks of power and privilege” (94). Improving our empathetic skills will make 
us “more sensitive and more attuned perceivers,” allowing us to understand better “the 
relationships we are in and to make them better” (94).
 
To achieve better empathy, we must engage in “critical attention, practice, and correc-
tion. . . . In other words, entangled empathy requires work” (94). That work carries es-
sential rewards, though: improving our relationships with others “through more mean-
ingful and mindful choices and actions” will enhance our moral agency (94).
In her pithy Afterword, pattrice jones notes the power of entangled empathy as a “use-
ful rhetorical shift”: helping people to see “that they are already in relationships with 
animals” and asking questions about them can elicit less resistance from those who are 
hostile to animal rights than standard arguments do. Entangled empathy can short-
circuit dishonest evasions, for the question becomes: “What are you going to do about 
the relationships you have with nonhuman animals?” (100). Jones notes that recover-
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ing “our animal capacity for empathy” will enhance our lives by bringing us back to “a 
felt awareness of the web of relationships in which we live” (103). This is “the beautiful 
bonus of this way of being in the world” (103-4).
Entangled Empathy reminds us that if we are willing to work at it, we have the power to 
enhance our empathy, our relationships with animals, and our moral agency—and thus 
to change the world.  
